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stock, "the Lord was sorry that he had made Saul killg over Israel" (NRSV).
2. Thanks to Chris Meyers for helpful comments on earlier drafts of this
review.

Shame: Theory, Therapy, Theology, by Stephen Pattison. Cambridge,
Cambridge University Press, 2000. Pp. x and 315. $65.00
DAVID A. HORNER, Biola University; Centers for Christian Study,
International
Shame, by its nature, avoids the public eye. So also has it been with modem scholarly analyses of shame, at least in comparison to its near relative,
guilt. This has changed in recent years, according to Stephen Pattison,
Cardiff University practical theologian, as "a plethora of books with a huge
variety of perspectives ranging from literature, sociology and philosophy
to various kinds of psychology has emerged on the topic of shame" (p. 1).
Still, a sufficient treatment of shame is lacking in theology, and he has written Shame: Theory, Therapy, Theology in order to meet this need.
Is shame good or bad? An impressive history of ethical and religious
thought weighs in on the positive side of shame's connection to morality.
Aristotle, e.g., commends shame (aidos), though he rejects Greek tradition
by not considering it fully a virtue. Shame is a kind of fear of disrepute,
which can serve to restrain young people from doing shameful acts.!
Similarly, Thomas Aquinas treats verecundia as a positive element of character, a kind of preparation for virtue. 2 For Puritan moralists, shame, as an
internalization of moral authority, is essential to moral education.3 John
Locke concurs: "Shame of doing amiss, and deserving Chastisement, is the
only true Restraint belonging to Virtue. The Smart of the Rod, if Shame
accompanies it not, soon ceases, and is forgotten, and will quickly by the
Use lose its Terror."4
In light of this tradition, Pattison's account of shame is striking, as he
focuses on a very different notion of shame, and draws a very different
moral assessment. He gives brief acknowledgement to shame's positive
role (pp. 2, 84-85), but does not develop an account of it, or explore its relation to the negative aspect or kind of shame ("chronic" or "dysfunctional"
shame) that is his almost exclusive focus. For Pattison, the relation
between shame and morality is overwhelmingly negative. He draws upon
literature that is primarily recent, psychological, and sociological in character, focusing on studies of "shamed" individuals whose psyches are damaged by traumatic personal experiences.
Shame is a deeply personal book, drawing from Pattison's own experience of chronic shame, an experience he attributes in part to his involvement in the Christian faith. (This experience included a "sense of ontological guilt, fundamentally defiled identity and basic badness" (p. 7), and an
experience of "ontological shame," i.e. "shame that relates to being human
and finding oneself to be limited and mortal" (p. 181).) Pattison sketches
three objectives for the study, roughly corresponding to the book's three
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parts: to provide an overview of the various understandings and
approaches to shame and "try to make sense of the phenomenon" of
shame; to "attempt to understand" chronic shame; and to "consider the
relationship between the ideology and practice of Christianity and human
experiences of shame" (p. 2). His success in reaching these objectives is
mixed. Pattison's overviews of the psychological and sociological literature are helpful, particularly in making the range of data accessible to practical theologians. His efforts toward "understanding" shame, however,
while illuminating in some aspects, fall short. Finally, while Pattison's discussion of Christianity and shame will aid in understanding how chronically shamed people may tend to interpret certain theological ideas and
practices, it falls far short of making plausible Pattison's conclusion that
orthodox Christian theology should be jettisoned.
In part I, Pattison extensively catalogues recent approaches to understanding the nature of emotions and shame. Apart from a few passages,
Pattison's approach to the data may be fairly characterized as "explication
without evaluation." His methodological commitments make it difficult
for him to reach his objective of moving from summarizing a "kaleidoscope" (p. 59) of studies and positions to providing a clear and fruitful
account of what shame is. Pattison lists and affirms the contributions of a
variety of disciplines and approaches, favoring some form of a further,
"social constructivist" methodological approach, one he characterizes as an
epistemological stance that sees all experience as socially and linguistically
constructed. He characterizes this approach as liberating, enabling us "to
take all the insights and approaches [provided by the other approaches1...
seriously as important languages about shame. However, it does not
require a commitment to any particular world view. We can look at the
various ways in which the concept 'shame' is used without being required
to make a judgment as to whether one way of thinking or speaking about
shame is 'more true' than another" (p. 60). This relativistic approach ultimately subverts Pattison's overall premise concerning shame, for, once
adopted, it also follows that there is no basis for concluding that any single
view of the goodness or badness of shame is any "more true" than any other.
But Pattison takes it as read that chronic shame is bad, and that, e.g., insofar as Christianity's ideas and practices produce shame in people, they
should be changed. These normative judgments are manifestly non-relativistic, but Pattison has ruled out any basis for making them.
Pattison also rejects "over-simplifying approaches" that "would produce what would then seem to be a speciously monolithic clarity about the
understanding of shame," abandoning "the quest for narrow definition,
synthesis, normativity and theoretical exclusivism" (p. 62). Unfortunately,
it is neither obvious just what these undesirable approaches actually
amount to, nor what rejecting them actually requires. For definitions or
rational accounts do not need to be overly narrow or simplistic; indeed, one
may think that an overly narrow definition just is a bad definition - one
that does not fully account for all that it needs to explain. Pattison, however, seems to regard "openness and humility" to require an abandoning of
the quest for definition itself. He opts for a "methodologically liberating,"
broader approach, which he describes as a Wittgensteinian "family resem-
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blance" theory (p. 61). Unforhmately, again, Pattison does not make clear
what in this case the family resemblances actually are. His approach
remains more a "kaleidoscope" of data and information than a prism of
clarity and understanding. This methodology also leads to inconsistencies
and gaps within Pattison's account, for he in fact eventually does provide
what amounts to a rough definition of shame: "a condition that denotes
alienation, isolation, defilement, depletion and pain, both individual and
social" (p. 154), and he suggests his own "working understanding" of
shame, as "toxic unwantedness" (p. 182). Both of these are suggestive.
However, they sit in tension with Pattison's stated methodology, and
when these accounts of shame do appear they are theoretically unmotivated and unjustified.
In part II Pattison turns primarily to the notion of chronic shame. He
lists and describes 24 "main characteristics of shame," many of which
include subsidiary characteristics. In chapter 5 he diverges from the explication mode, to articulate his own position. Here he considers the effects
of shame on ethics and morality. "Chronically shamed people are presocial and pre-moral ... while they may often behave in socially acceptable
and conformist ways, they will not really be capable of exercising reliable
moral judgment and responsibility" (p. 124). Some of the possible moral
results of chronic shame include anger and rage, addictions, sloth (indeed,
the whole range of the seven deadly sins), and contempt for others (127).
From an ethical perspective this discussion raises some interesting and
potentially fruitful ideas. Here I was struck, however, by the disparity
between Pattison's almost wholly negative view of the relation between
morality and shame and the generally very positive view of it in the western ethical tradition, and the fact that Pattison simply does not develop the
positive side or even explore its relation to his argument. Granted, this is
not an ethics book; still, it covers important moral ground, and Pattison
makes a number of moral claims about shame. His lack of deeper ethical
analysis leaves a gaping lacuna that, at best, renders his moral conclusions
inconclusive. I suspect that Pattison's approach evidences a broader (cultural) conceptual shift regarding shame (and related notions), not in the
terms of the discussion, but in the background framework according to
which the terms are understood - from something like an "ethical" conception of shame to a "psychological" conception.5 Pattison's study reflects
the psychological conception - it constitutes his starting point, and he construes the moral aspects of shame from within that stance.
Part III deals with shame and Christianity. Pattison surveys contemporary theological accounts of shame, deeming them all to be lacking, particularly in their recognition of the part that religion itself plays in engendering and exploiting chronic shame. On this score, Pattison's diagnosis of
traditional Christian thought and practice is severe. According to Pattison,
the "ascent of the monarchical deity [of Jewish and medieval Christian
thought] and the rise of human shame are almost contemporaneous in
Judaeo-Christian mythology" (pp. 235-6). The "God of the Old Testament"
does not fare well: "The hallmark of divine laughter is of aggressive mocking, scorn and ridicule, not that of merriment and joy. This shame-producing laughter from a contemptuous, shameless God is not an encouraging
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starting point for those who would wish theological ideas and images to
address, reduce and alleviate human shame rather than to exacerbate it."
Indeed, for Pattison, 'The God of the Old Testament is a kind of all-toohuman oriental despot who overtly exploits shame in the interests of bolstering his own power and control" (p. 236).
Beyond its references that are directly related to shame, Christian theology, even in its abstract ideas and doctrines, "may produce" responses of
shame in shame-prone people. Pattison lists as problematic eleven divine
attributes, a veritable summary of the historic orthodox understanding of
God - e.g., that God is: wholly different from human beings; pure and
holy; perfect, good and complete in "Godself"; omnipotent; omnipresent;
and that God punishes wickedness and sin. These ideas contribute to,
among other things, humiliation, unlovableness, inferiority, defilement,
devaluation of one's embodied humanity, alienation from self and the
divine, crushing one's sense of goodness, sense of falling short of perfection, lack of autonomy, and feelings of worthlessness, impotence and
unwantedness (pp. 236-241). Pattison concludes personally that in order to
resolve the problem of shame he must reject the historic orthodox Christian
understanding of God: "If God is no longer all-good and all-powerful in
the way that I used to think, I am no longer all-bad and passively helpless
either" (p. 314).
Further contributing to responses of shame, on Pattison's account, are
inadequate accounts of the nature and relations between humility, pride,
and self-esteem, and unclarity about the nature and validity of self-concern
in Christianity theology and ethics. He concludes with specific suggestions
for addressing the problematic issues in theology and practice, informed
by the dominant metaphor of the inclusiveness of the Son of Man who
came "to seek and to save that which was lost" (p. 309). As noted, this
involves, for Pattison, a rejection of the orthodox Christian conception of
God (Epilogue).
This discussion raises important practical and relational questions concerning how theological ideas and practices may tend to be "heard" and
"seen," especially by those carrying extra emotional baggage. These questions, however, may be distinguished from questions about what the ideas
and practices actually mean and whether they are true or valid. The latter
questions have historically been considered primary. However, Pattison
seems eager to jettison them, or to conflate them with the former - as
indeed his methodology might suggest, when applied to theology.
"Theology is a set of polysemic images, metaphors, similes, narratives and
myths ... Because Christian ideas and images are polyvocal, pluralistic
and susceptible to many interpretations there is seldom one absolutely
'correct' interpretation ... Theological images and ideas are human artefacts that emerge from a particular socio-political and historical milieu ...
often reveal[ing] more about the human beings who constructed them and
their world view and assumptions than they necessarily do about the
nature and being of God" (pp. 232-233). Thus, Pattison appears to think,
one may justifiably abandon core beliefs of Christian theology when one
concludes that believing them may engender shame in those who are
shame-prone. An obvious problem with this stance is that it is self-defeat-
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ing (why not consider this view of theology to be merely a human artifact
that says more about Pattison than about the nature of reality?)
Moreover the negative self-esteem implications that Pattison enumerates simply do not necessarily follow from the Christian doctrine of God.
His account rests upon a kind of ontological zero-sum economy in which,
if X has a certain amount of power or value, then Y thereby lacks power or
value to that extent. If God is all-good and all-powerful, then I am all-bad
and passively helpless. But this view is no more adequate in theology and
metaphysics than it is in economic theory or any other area. Michael
Jordan's skill in basketball does not ipso facto reduce my skill; only I can do
that. True, if Jordan is the world's best basketball player, then, analytically,
I cannot also be the world's best basketball player. But all that follows
from that, by analogy, is that if God is the supreme instance of goodness
and power, then I cannot also be. But how is this a problem?
More seriously, from the standpoint of traditional Christian theology,
Pattison's approach has the effect of (following Voltaire's quip) seeking to
make God in our own image, on the basis of what we think enhances our
self-esteem. Does this not, in effect, constitute a shaming of God? "How
long, 0 men, will you tum my glory into shame? How long will you love
delusions and seek false gods?" (Psalm 4.2).6
The ingredients for a much more plausible, self-esteem-enhancing ontology are available to Pattison within the historic Christian tradition itself, in
the orthodox doctrine of creation, especially as it is understood along the
lines of Augustine and Aquinas in their understanding of the metaphysics
of goodness. On this view, God, the maximally perfect being, and ground
of all other being and value, out of the overflow of his goodness, chose to
create fully real natures, which themselves possess great value as created
things, are good insofar as they exist, and are created by God to develop
and flourish fully as instances of their kinds. Unlike Pattison's view, which
holds the very nature of ultimate reality and value hostage to the vagaries
of one's sense of self-esteem, this account provides a robust metaphysical
grounding for value, as well as an objective warrant and direction for
authentic self-realization. Further, with respect to the important issues he
raises with regard to humility, pride, self-esteem, and self-concern in
Christian theology and ethics, Pattison would do well to explore the rich
resources within the Christian tradition of Thomas Aquinas, who grounds
his ethics in a flourishing-based ethical structure that accounts for both
self- and other-concern in plausible and biblically faithful ways. Aquinas's
understanding of the relations between pride and humility is complex and
nuanced, bringing together both a healthy humility and a healthy, fruitful
appreciation of oneself and one's gifts. 7
NOTES
1. Nichomachean Ethics 4.9,10.9.
2. Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics, 4.17; Summa Theologiae
IIaIIae.l44.
3. See J. D. Hunter, The Death of Character: Moral Education in an Age
Without Good or Evil (New York: Basic Books, 2000), 35.
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Cited in ibid., 35.
This kind of distinction is developed in D. F. Wells, Losing Our Virtue:
Why the Church Must Recover Its Moral Vision (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans,
1998),34-35.
6. The biblical tradition does express concern for the kind of shame or
humiliation Pattison addresses. See Deuteronomy 25.3, where legitimate punishment should be severe, but not inhumane, where it will humiliate or
degrade the guilty party.
7. See D. A. Horner, "What it Takes to be Great: Aristotle and Aquinas on
Magnanimity," Faith and Philosophy 15 (1998), 415-444.

